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This paper deals with modelling of congestion charging at airports. The congestion 
charging represents internalising of the system additional (marginal) delays imposed by 
an additional aircraft on the succeeding aircraft during congestion period. The existing 
concepts of the congestion charging are additionally concretised by taking into account 
the real-life congestion conditions and differences between the particular flights in 
terms of their scheduling time, type in terms of the seat capacity, operational cost, 
duration (short, medium, long-haul), the number of passengers on board, and revenues.   
The queuing model based on a diffusion approximation is used to estimate the airport 
congestion and delay. Additional models are developed to estimate feasibility of the 
flight access to an airport with the internalised congestion. The numerical experiments 
with the model are carried out to illustrate an application of the proposed modelling 
procedure.   
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Air transport congestion has increased during the past decade both in Europe and U.S. 
The main reasons have been growing demand, constrained capacity of infrastructure, 
and disruptions of scheduled services (Janic, 2003). The congestion caused by the 
imbalance between demand and capacity has been remedied by the improvements of 
utilisation of existing capacity, physical expansion of infrastructure, and demand 
management. The first option has shown to have the limited effect. In many cases, the 
second option has been difficult or even impossible to be implemented in the short-term 
due to the various political and environmental constraints in terms of noise, air pollution 
and land use. The last, demand management has recently been considered as potentially 
viable option to relieve the congestion problem (Adler, 2001; DeCota, 2001; Federal 
Aviation Administration, 2001) 
In addition to the institutional instruments, demand management at airports embraces 
the economic instruments such as congestion charging and auctions of slots. A central 
issue of the congesting charging relates to the estimation of marginal delay cost 
imposed by an additional flight to all other subsequent flights during congested period. 
In such a context, the additional flight has to pay its private cost of delay and a charge 
equivalent to the marginal cost of delays imposed on the subsequent flights during 
congestion period. This charge may increase the overall flight cost, and thus 
compromise its overall profitability. The current charging system at the European and 
U.S. airports is mainly based on the aircraft weights and has a little in common with the 
above concept of congestion charging (Airport Council International, 2001; Adler, 
2002; Doganis, 1992).    
This paper deals with modelling of the congestion charging at an airport. In addition to 
this introduction, the paper consists of four sections. Section 2 provides an insight into 
the problem of congestion at the European and U.S airports. Section 3 elaborates the 
real-life conditions under which congestion charging could be implemented (i.e., 
internalised). Section 4 deals with modelling of congestion charging. Section 5 provides 
the numerical examples demonstrating usefulness of the modelling procedure. Section 5 
contains some conclusions.      
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2 AIRPORT DEMAND, CAPACITY AND CONGESTION IN EUROPE AND 
   UNITED STATES    
  
Dealing with congestion charging at airports includes an analysis of the relevant 
parameters such as demand, capacity and congestion. Demand is represented by the 
flights scheduled at an airport, usually by one or more airlines. At many large European 
and U.S. (hub and non-hub) airports, the most numerous are the flights of one or few 
airlines, their subsidiaries and alliance partners. These flights use the available arrival 
and departure slots, i.e., the airport declared capacity
1, while getting in service at the 
airport. 
 
2.1 Demand versus capacity  
   
The number of flights at an airport is always balanced with the airport declared capacity 
aiming at preventing serious congestion. In Europe, the initial demand and available 
airport capacity are balanced through the multi-stage process of negotiations between  
airlines, airports and air traffic control. In such a context, the demand is generally not 
allowed to exceed the capacity for the long period of time, which, under the regular 
functioning, excludes serious congestion. Nevertheless, due to the system imperfectness 
and the other disrupting factors, the actual demand frequently exceeds the airport 
declared capacity and thus causes congestion and delays (EUROCONTROL, 2002, 
Janic, 2003).   
In the U.S., the demand and capacity are balanced through the multistage process too. 
However, in this case, the initial demand driven by both the market forces and the 
airline scheduling practice is allowed to exceed the airport capacity frequently during 
the short periods of time. In such case, the consequent congestion and delays are 
assumed to be the planned categories (ATA, 2002, Liang et al., 2000). Also in this case, 
disrupting factors may affect the planned operations and thus unpredictably increase 
                                                 
1 In Europe, the number of arrival and departure flights accommodated at an airport during given period 
of time (usually one hour) under given conditions determines the airport declared capacity. This capacity 
is based on IMC (Instrumental Meteorological Conditions) and IFR (Instrumental Flight Rules). Usually, 
this capacity is an agreed value between airlines, airports and air traffic control (EUROCONTROL, 
2002). In the U.S., the airport capacity has usually two values: the ‘optimal’ one determined for VMC  
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anticipated congestion and delays (Federal Aviation Administration, 2001, 2002a; Janic, 
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Figure 1 The relationships between demand and capacity at U.S. airports (Compiled 
from Federal Aviation Administration, 2002a) 
b) Atlanta Hartsfield airport  
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capacity at New York LaGuardia airport (U.S) during one peak day, 30 June 2001 
(beginning of the Independence Day holiday) (Federal Aviation Administration, 2002a). 
As can be seen, at the first stage the initial demand was much higher than the airport 
actual capacity (which was lower than the declared capacity). At the second stage, the 
demand was suppressed closer to the expected capacity but remained above the capacity 
during the morning.    
Figure 1b illustrates the relationship between the airport demand and capacity at the 
U.S. Atlanta Hartsfield airport during the same day (30 June 2001). As can be seen, the 
demand pattern has been quite different than at LaGuardia airport illustrating the 
different – hub-and-spoke - pattern of the main incumbent (Delta Airlines). In the 
morning and afternoon hours the realised demand has been lower than the capacity, but 
it has considerable exceeded the capacity (which has also changed during the day) in the 
late afternoon and evening (18.00-22.00) hours.  
 
2.2 Congestion and delays  
 
Airport congestion causes delays of flights. In general, delay is defined as the difference 
between the actual and scheduled time of being at the ‘referent location’. The threshold 
for either arrival or departure delayed flight is the period of 15 or more minutes behind 
the schedule (Association of European Airlines, 2001; Bureau of Transport Statistics, 
2001; EUROCONTROL, 2001; Federal Aviation Administration, 2002a,).  
At the European and U.S. airports, the congestion and delays have become their 
common (and inherent) operational characteristic. Table 1 shows some relevant 
statistics. As can be seen, the proportion of delayed flights has been different in both 
regions. In Europe, this proportion has varied between 17% and 30% for arrivals, and 
8% to 24% for departures. In the U.S., the proportion has varied between 22% and 40% 
for arrivals, and from 19% to 38% for departures. In general, more frequent delays have 
taken place at the U.S. than the European airports Delays at airports are generally 
expressed as the averages per any flight and the averages per delayed flight (the total 
delay divided by the number of all or by the number of only delayed flights per period, 
respectively) (EUROCONTROL/ECAC, 2002; Federal Aviation Administration, 
2002a).        
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Table 1: Flight delays at congested European and U.S. airports  
(%) of delayed  
flights 
 














Paris  CDG  24.6 21.8    Chicago-O’Hare  33.6 29.9 
London Heathrow   17.4  21.0    Newark  38.4  31.0 
Frankfurt  30.8 18.9    Atlanta  30.9 26.8 
Amsterdam  25.7  23.2    NY-La Guardia   40.1  28.9 
Madrid/Barajas 19.6 20.0    San  Francisco 32.1 21.5 
Munich  19.0 19.0    Dallas-Ft.  Worth  21.7 23.7 
Brussels  29.8 27.7    Boston  Logan 37.7 29.3 
Zurich  23.2 23.8    Philadelphia  40.4 37.9 
Rome/Fiumicino -  12.5    NY-Kennedy    28.0  19.0 
Copenhagen/K  17.8 10.3    Phoenix  29.6 30.8 
Stockholm/Arlanda   -  8.0    Detroit  24.6  26.3 
London/Gatwick   19.6  24.3    Los Angeles  26.1  20.8 
Sources: EUROCONTOL/ECAC, 2002; Federal Aviation Administration, 2002a 
 
In addition, segregation of delays into the arrival and departure delays is often carried 
out. Figure 2 (a and b) shows both types of delays at 32 U.S. and 17 European most 
congested airports in dependence on the average annual demand/capacity ratio (i.e., 
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As can be seen, the average delay per flight – departure or arrival - has been generally 
longer at the U.S than European airports. At the U.S. airports, the departure delays have 
generally been longer than the arrival delays. The former has varied between 10 and 20, 
and the latter between 5 and 15 minutes. At the European airports, there has not been 
obvious distinction between the average delay per an arrival and departure flight. 
Almost all delays have been shorter than 15 minutes. In both regions, the very slight 
increasing of delays for both operations in line with increasing of the demand/capacity 
ratio have been noticeable. According to the threshold of 15 minutes, the flights in both 
samples should not be considered delayed at all. 
The picture changes when the delays per delayed flights are considered. In given 
sample, the average delay per delayed flight  – arrival and departure - has again been 
longer at the U.S. than European airports, 40-60 minutes compared to 15–25 minutes, 
respectively. In both regions, these delays have been the similar for both types of flight 
operations and rather non-influenced by the airport demand/capacity ratio. According to 
the threshold of 15 minutes, these have been the really delayed flights, but caused by 
Figure 2 Examples of the dependability between the average delay and average annual
utilisation of the airport capacity  
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many causes. In the U.S., on average, bad weather has caused about 70-75% and 
congestion about 20-30% of these delays (Bureau of Transport Statistics, 2001; Federal 
Aviation Administration, 2001; 2002a). In Europe, on average, severe weather has 
caused only 1-4% and congestion about 30-40% of these delays (Association of 
European Airlines, 2001; EUROCONTROL, 2001).  
Figure 2 (a and b) also shows that the average demand/capacity ratio, i.e., the utilisation 
of the airport capacity, has varied between 25% and 65%, and between 35% and 75 % at 
the U.S. and European airports, respectively. This indicates that, at almost all airports, at 
an average annual scale, the external factors influencing demand as well as the demand 
management have always kept the demand at the level lower than the capacity, as a rule 
for preventing the extreme congestion (Welch and Lloyd, 2001; Odoni and Fan, 2001).  
 
 
3 CONGESTION CHARGING AT AIRPORTS   
 
3.1 Background   
 
Dynamic interaction of the demand and capacity cause congestion at airports. The rate 
of such interaction is commonly measured by ratio of the intensity of demand and 
capacity (or the capacity utilisation ratio), which generally may take the values lower, 
equal or greater than one. Specifically, if the intensity of demand is equal to the 
capacity, this ratio is equal to 1.0 (or 100%) (Newell, 1982). At the most European and 
U.S congested airports, contrary to the above-mentioned averages, this ratio often 
reaches or even exceeds the value 1.0 (100%), particularly during the short peak periods 
of an hour or quarter of hour, which suggests occurrence of the significant congestion 
and delays
2 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2001; 2002a). This gives rise to the 
question of managing this ratio and thus congestion below the threshold levels. In the 
short-term, this seems to be possible by the demand management, and particularly by 
using its economic instrument - congestion charging (Vickery, 1969).  
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3.2 Inherent complexity of implementation  
 
Up to date, despite being theoretically matured clear and warmly recommended by the 
academic economics and policy-making literature, congestion charging has still not 
found practical application at the congested airports. The main causes could be 
summarised as  ‘collision with the overall airport objectives including the lack of real 
cases’, ‘complexity of measurement’, ‘ambiguity of the concept’ and ‘barriers within 
the industry’.  
 
3.2.1 Collision with the airport objectives and the lack of real cases 
Most airports worldwide have always intended to grow under given circumstances due 
to their internal (economic) as well as wider external (economic and political) regional 
and national interests. The growth has assumed attraction of as great as possible traffic. 
Under such circumstances, physical expansion of infrastructure capacity has always 
been used as the most feasible long-term solution for relieving congestion despite the 
various short-term social, political and environmental barriers. Consequently, the very 
rare, if any, airports have considered congestion charging as the viable short-term 
remedy. At the same time, the revenues from combined aeronautical
3 and non-
aeronautical charges have provided coverage of the airport operational costs and partly 
funding of investments. 
  
3.2.2 Complexity of measurement of conditions 
Many simultaneous causes have usually caused congestion, of which the 
demand/capacity ratio being around or greater than one during the peaks has been 
among the most important ones. These peaks have been different at different airports in 
terms of frequency and duration, type of operations, and type of aircraft involved.   
In terms of the frequency and duration, the short and frequent peaks have been mostly 
created by the airline hub-and-spoke operations. The long and infrequent peaks have 
                                                                                                                                              
2 It is well known that if demand/capacity ratio is lower or close to 1.0 (100%) congestion occurs mainly 
due to the random variability of the flight inter-arrival and service time. If this ratio is greater than 1.0 
(100%), the excessive demand dominates as the cause of congestion (Newell, 1982). 
3 A part of the aeronautical charges has consisted of landing fees based on the aircraft weight (Airport 
Council International, 2001).    
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been created due to large demand, which has exceeded capacity for several hours during 
the day.   
In terms of the type of operation and aircraft types, congestion during the peaks have 
affected both arrival and departure flights and sometimes transferred delays between 
them. These flights have been carried out by the same or different aircraft types of either 
co-operated or competed airlines. In addition, the materialised congestion has often 
been additionally affected by other causes, which has made extraction of the relevant 
causes for the purpose of the congestion charging complex or even impossible. In 
addition, there has been the lack of criteria for setting up the relevant level of congestion 
to be internalised. Since congestion caused delays up to the threshold of 15 minutes 
have not been counted,  only the longer ones (but which?) have deserved to be 
internalised (Airport Council International, 2001, Odoni and Fan, 2001; Janic, 2003). In 
addition, internalising of congestion due to the airline hub-and-spoke operations or due 
to disruptions of the airport capacity, which might cause delays longer than 15 minutes 
has been questionable. In the former case, the internalisation could compromise 
integrity of the airline schedules, and thus force the affected airlines to leave the airport. 
In the latter case, internalising of congestion caused by the factors out of control of 
airlines airports and air traffic control could be difficult to justify.  
 
3.2.3 Ambiguity of the concept and barriers within the industry  
Congestion charging at airports seems to be itself ambiguous. Actually, it is supposed to 
impose a charge on an additional flight equivalent to the cost of marginal delay cost, 
which this flight imposes on the succeeding flights during congestion period. The 
objective is to deter (i.e., prevent) appearance of such flight (and to divert all other 
flights, which create congestion), which seems to be in collision with the guaranteed 
freedoms of the unlimited access to airports (Corbett, 2002). In addition, this charge is 
supposed be effective, which in the case of imperfection of the real market might not be 
true. The charge simply may either be too low to be effective, or too strong to 
unwillingly suppress the elastic demand. As well, internalising and relations between 
this and the other airport externalities (burdens) such as noise or air pollution, as well as 
the relations of these with existing charging schemes based on the aircraft take-off 
weight are not quite clear and transparent. Furthermore, there may be a problem of  
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spending the collected charges. If they would be used for increasing of the airport 
capacity by expansion of infrastructure, the source of revenues – congestion  – would 
vanish afterwards for a while. It is less likely to consider allocation of this money 
outside the industry. Last but not least, it seems difficult and sensitive to impose the 
additional charges to the economically and financially vulnerable airline industry.   
All above reasons have contributed to building up the opposition against congestion 
charging. Adler (2002) has identified three groups of barriers as follows:  
 
•  Institutional, organisational, political and legal barriers maintained by the 
monopolistic powerful hub airports (Europe) and powerful airlines (both in Europe 
and U.S.) including lack of harmonisation of charging conditions across the 
countries (Europe) and across the airports of different size (both in Europe and 
U.S.); 
•  Unacceptability of the concept for large airlines and their alliances (lobby groups) 
due to the lack of similar concepts at most other transport modes (both in Europe 
and the U.S.); and  
•  Technological barriers in collection of the relevant data on the actual causes of 
congestion at airports including the precise data on the airport capacity (Europe). 
Relatively useful databases already exist in the U.S. (FAA, 2002a).  
 
 
4 MODELLING CONGESTION CHARGING AT AN AIRPORT     
 
4.1 The previous research 
 
A long time ago, the economic theory noted that optimal use of a congested transport 
facility – in this case an airport – could not be achieved unless each user (flight) was 
forced to pay the marginal delay costs that it imposed on all other subsequent flights 
during congestion. In the nineties, this marginal delay cost has been considered as the 
externality to be internalised together with some other externalities such as air pollution, 
noise and air traffic accidents (Adler, 2002; Brueckner, 2002; Daniel, 1995; Daniel and 
Pahwa, 2000; Daniel, 2001; EC, 1997; European Conference of Ministers of Transport,  
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1998; Odoni and Fan, 2001; Vickery, 1969). In such a context, some researchers 
proposed charging of the marginal delays caused by the hub-and-spoke operations. 
They used the steady-state and time-dependent, analytically efficient and attractive, 
queuing models to estimate the cost of congestion and delay to be internalised. 
Nevertheless, it was not quite clear why alleviation of the peaks by congestion charging 
was suggested since the airport airlines and passenger already found a balance of their 
interests within given circumstances (Daniel, 1995; Daniel, 2001). Comparison of 
different models of the airport congestion charging produced some interesting results on 
the models’ performance, but again failed to properly address the reasons for 
suppressing the peaks already agreed by the particular actors involved by congestion 
charging (Daniel and Pahwa, 2000). In addition, some research also tackled the problem 
of congestion charging at airports where the airlines might have different market 
dominance, under an assumption that they had already internalised their congestion cost 
(Bruckener, 2002). 
Despite being theoretically sophisticated and advanced, almost all above (economic) 
models suffered from a lack of sufficient reality, which was one of the reasons why they 
remained mostly within the academic domain. One of the factors making them too 
unrealistic, with partial exception of the work of Daniel (1995; 2001) and Brueckner 
(2001), related to the analogy between congested roads and airports, where the only 
similarity shown to be type of the ‘predictable’ queues (Hall, 1991). In addition, the 
models a priory assumed that congestion charging based on the marginal delay cost 
would be effective as expected. As well, some recent research has suggested 
implementation of the congestion charging (in addition to other externalities) non-
selectively (for example, at all or almost all European airports), which could face the 
strong opposition of both the airports and airlines (Adler, 2002).                 
 
4.2 Assumptions   
 
In this paper, modelling of the congestion charging at an airport as the continuation of 
previous research, is based on several assumptions. The time–varying demand and 
capacity profile at the candidate airport need to be known during typical (representative) 
day. The demand profile can be obtained from the published airport (and airline)  
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schedule(s). In such a context, each flight (or a group of the similar flights) is 
considered with respect to the average operational cost and revenue. The capacity 
profile(s) can be obtained from the airport or air traffic control operator for given 
conditions (IMC or VMC). This capacity reflects the average service time of the 
particular arriving and departing flights. The runway system is assumed to be a critical 
element of the airport congestion.   
Only the long peaks in which the demand/capacity ratio is coming close to or exceeding 
1.0 (100%) and thus cause severe congestion are considered for internalising. This 
assumption can be used for selection of the candidate airports, which has not been the 
case in some previous studies (Adler, 2002).     
The number of flights during such peaks is assumed to be large (at least several dozens), 
which makes congestion mainly dependent on the predictable variations (and positive 
differences) between demand and capacity
4.  This makes application of the queuing 
model based on the diffusion approximation for estimation of congestion and delays 
convenient (Hall, 1991; Newell, 1982).  
 
4.4 The model structure  
 
4.4.1 Estimating the queues at a congested airport   
Congestion charging at an airport requires estimation of the system marginal delay, 
which consists of the sum of i) the private cost of delay of the additional flight, and ii) 
the cost of marginal (additional) delay, which this flight imposes on the succeeding 
flights during the  congested period (Ghali and Smith, 1995; Hall, 1991). These delays 
can be estimated by using the various queuing models and simulation developed up to 
date (Hall, 1998; Newell, 1982; Odoni et al., 1997). In these models, congestion is 
usually related to the time-dependent demand/capacity ratio ρ (t). At an airport, at time 
(t), ρ (t) = λ (t)/µ(t) where λ (t) is the flight arrival rate (i.e., the demand for service) and 
µ(t) is the capacity (i.e., the flight service rate). Different techniques are developed to 
estimate congestion and related delays in dependence on ρ (t). One of them, a graphical 
                                                 
4 For example, for the non-stationary Poisson arrival/departure processes, if the number of users-
customers during given period is greater, the smaller will be the random variations of this number (Hall, 
1991).      
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representation of the typical queuing process at the congested facility (an airport) during 























The  A(t) and D(t) represent the cumulative counts of flights requesting service and 
being served, respectively, by time (t). Since the number of flights in the system is 
assumed to be large (>> 1.0) both types of counts, actually being the step functions of 
time, can be considered as their continuous (smooth) counterparts. Consequently, λ (t) = 
dA(t)/dt  and  µ(t) = dD(t)/dt. The functions A(t) and D(t) may relate only to one 
realisation or be the averages of many daily realisations of serving the flights at the 
congested airport(s). Dependent on the relationships between two curves, three sub-
periods can be identified. In the first one (0, t1), the A(t) lies below D(t) and ρ (t) is less 
Figure 3 A scheme of a typical queuing process at the congested airport – the 

























  Ak+1 
  Dk+1 
A(t) – Cumulative arrivals;  
Qk+1 – Queue at time (k+1)∆ t; 
dk+1 – Delay of the new arrival at time (k+1)∆ t;  
wk+1 – Marginal delays imposed by the new arrival at time (k+1)∆ t 
τ  - Duration of the peak-congested period  
t1  t2 
dk+1 
T 
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than 1.0. In this case only the “random effects” cause congestion. During the second 
sub-period (t1, t2) ≡  τ , the A(t) exceeds the curve D(t). The values of ρ (t) fluctuate from 
being equal, greater, again equal, and finally less than one. In this case, ‘deterministic 
effects’ are the main causes of congestion while the previously important ‘random 
effects’ are negligible. Finally, during the sub-period (t2,T) the A(t) again drops bellow 
D(t) and the similar developments as in the first sub-period take place. Obviously, only  
the congestion during the period (τ ) should be considered to be internalised since it is 
certainly able to produce the delays longer than the threshold of 15 minutes (Hall, 1991; 
Newell, 1982). To estimate these congestion and delays, let period (τ ) be divided into K 
equal increments ∆ t (i.e., K∗ ∆ t ≈  τ ). Each increment ∆ t should be sufficiently short
5 in 
comparison to the period (τ ) in order to register the changes of congestion and delays on 
the one hand and sufficiently long to guarantee the independence between the 
cumulative flight arrival and departure processes and their independence during the 
successive increments, on the other. Thus, two processes A(t) and D(t) can be treated as 
the processes of independent increments or the diffusion processes (Newell, 1982). 
Under an assumption that the differences between the cumulative flight demand and 
corresponding airport capacity in (k)th and (k+1)st time increment ∆ t, A(k+1) – A(k) ≡  
Ak+1 – Ak and D(k+1) – D (k) ≡  Dk+1 – Dk, respectively, are considered as the stochastic 
variables with the normal probability distribution, the difference  1 1 1 + + + − = k k k D A Q , 
which represents the queue in (k+1)st increment ∆ t, will also be the stochastic variable 
with normal probability distribution (k∈ K) (Newell, 1982). Consequently, the flight 
queue in (k+1)st interval ∆ t, can be approximated as follows:  
 




Qk  is the queue in (k)th increment ∆ t; 
 
                                                 
5 For example, if (τ ) is the period of several hours during the day, ∆ t will certainly be quarter, half or an hour.  
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1 k k Q , Q +
 
is the average queue in (k)th and (k+1)st increment ∆ t, respectively; 
 
λ k+1  is the intensity of flight demand in (k+1)st increment ∆ t; 
  
µ k+1  is the airport capacity (i.e., the flight service rate) during (k+1)st increment 
∆ t; 
 
1 k B +   is the anticipated deviation of the actual flight queue (i.e., a “buffer”) from 
its average in (k+1)st increment ∆ t. 
 
As can be seen, the average flight queue either increases or decreases accordingly as 
λ k+1 >µ k+1 or λ k+1 < µ k+1.   
The anticipated deviation Bk+1  in the expression (1) can be estimated as follows 
(Newell, 1982):  
 












1 , 1 , ; + + k d k a t t   is the average flight inter-arrival and service time, respectively, in 
(k+1)st increment ∆ t;  
 
1 k d,   1 k , a σ ; σ + +   is the standard deviation of the flight inter-arrival and service time,   
respectively, in (k+1)st increment ∆ t; 
 
C  is constant (C = Φ
-1(1-p), where Φ
-1 is the inverse Laplace’s  function 
and p is the probability that the flight queue in (k+1)st increment ∆ t will 
spill out of the confidence interval ( 1 + k Q ± 1 + k B) . 
 
In the expression (2), the variance of distributions of the flight inter-arrival and service 
time are assumed to be independent in the successive (k)th and (k+1)st increment ∆ t   
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(Newell, 1982):  
In expression (1) and Figure 3, at the beginning of period (τ ), the intensity of flight 
demand becomes equal to the capacity for the first time, and the deterministic queue 
starts to build up. However, this queue joins the queue already built up due to the 
previously dominating ‘random effects’. The latter queue  0 Q  can be approximated as 
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m  is the index of time increment ∆ t in which the intensity of flight demand 
becomes equal to the flight service rate (i.e., capacity) (m∈ K). 
   
Other symbols are analogous to those in the previous expressions. 
 
4.4.2 Determining the system delays and their costs  
From expressions (1)–(3), delay of a flight joining the queue in (k+1)st increment ∆ t 
can be approximated as follows:  
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where the symbols are analogous to those in the previous expressions.  
Expression (4) assumes that the flight service rate (i.e., the airport capacity) does not 
change during serving the queue  1 k Q + .   
In Figure 3, the marginal delay, which an additional flight arrived during (k+1)st 
increment ∆ t imposes on all subsequent flights until the end of the period (τ ) can be 
determined as:  
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where all symbols are analogous to those in the previous expressions.  
As can be seen from the expression (5), the marginal delay, which the additional flight 
imposes on the succeeding flights, is proportional to the product of its service time (i.e., 
the airport flight service rate - capacity - at the time it takes place) and the number of the 
succeeding - affected - flights. Diminishing of the airport capacity combined with its 
increased volatility certainly increases the marginal delays. As well, if the additional 
flight is scheduled closer to the beginning of the peak, the marginal delays will be 
longer, and vice versa.  
If the additional flight belongs to the group of Ni(τ )  uniformly distributed flights 
scheduled by airline (i) during the peak (τ )  in addition to the flights of other M-1 





i ) τ ( A ) τ ( N ) τ ( N , the total cost it imposes to all succeeding 
flights can be determined as follows:  
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where                                                                                                                                                  
 
cl  is the average cost per unit of delay of a flight scheduled in (l)th increment ∆ t 
(in the monetary units per unit of time).  
 
Other symbols are analogous to those in the previous expressions.  
The cost per flight cl may include the aircraft operational and passenger time costs. 
Expression (6) shows that the total marginal cost imposed by the new flight of airline (i) 
on the succeeding flights will increase with decreasing of the airport service rate 
(capacity) and increasing of its volatility. In addition, this cost will rise with increasing  
Milan J., Roger S. – ERSA-STELLA 2003  
 
19
of the number and size (expenses) of flights involved in the peak. As well, under the 
other fixed conditions, this marginal cost will decrease with increasing of the number of 
flights scheduled by a given airline, which has already internalised its congestion 
externality. This implies that the congestion charging might favour the markedly 
already strong airlines and disfavour the airlines endeavouring to strengthen their 
market position (by the new flights) or the new entrants (without the flights at all). This 
looks like a protection of the already gained rights - monopolies and oligopolies.  
 
4.4.3 The profitability of an additional flight  
The congestion charge should also be able to compromise the expected profitability of 
the additional flights. If  1 k ,
i
m C +  is the charge and  ) n ( c
i
1 k+  is the average cost per unit of 
time of an additional flight of capacity (n) of airline (i) (in the monetary units per unit of 
time) in (k+1)-th increment ∆ t, the total cost of this flight will be estimated as follows:  
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is the duration of the additional flight of airline (i) scheduled in (k+1)st 
increment ∆ t  
 
Other symbols are analogous to those in the previous expressions.  
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i
1 k+   is the average airfare per passenger of the new flight of route length 
(L) scheduled by airline (i) in (k+1)st increment ∆ t; 
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1 k + +
 
is the expected load factor of the new flight carried out by airline (i) 
in (k+1)st increment ∆ t assumed to be dependent on price;  
 
i
1 k n +   is the seat capacity of the new flight of airline (i) in (k+1)st 
increment ∆ t. 
 
This new flight will be unprofitable, if the following condition is fulfilled:  
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where all symbols are as in the previous expressions.  
To achieve the above condition, the charge 
i
k m C 1 , + should be slightly greater than the 
maximum value between the expected profits per flight and cost of marginal delay, 
other factors constant. In such case, the airline will try to compensate the charge by 
increasing airfares. However, as can be intuitively concluded, the proportion of increase 
in the airfare will be higher at the smaller-cheaper flights, which impose the marginal 
delay cost on the greater number of the more expensive succeeding flights, than 
otherwise. In practice, this means that the small regional planes intending to operate at 
the congested airport(s) in the morning peak(s) will be penalised more. Consequently, in 
the case of elastic demand, increasing of airfares will force some passengers to give up, 
which will additionally deepen the losses and finally discourage the airline to launch the 
new flight at the intended time.  
 
 
5 NUMERICAL APPLICATION   
 
The proposed modelling procedure of the congestion charging is demonstrated on the 
case of New York (NY) LaGuardia airport. This is one among three biggest airports 
serving the New York area (U.S.). In terms of the type of traffic, three airports mainly 
co-operate among each other. LaGuardia airport mainly serves the U.S. domestic short- 
and medium-distance traffic. About 92% of flights are the origin-destination flights  
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carrying about 45-55% business passengers. One of the reasons is closeness of the 
airport to the New York centre Manhattan, about 18km. After September 11/2001 
terrorist attack and a sharp decline just afterwards, the traffic has gradually recovered 
and reached the annual number of about 22 million passengers and 358 thousands of 
flights by the end of the year 2002. The average number of passengers per flight has 
been always relatively stable during the past five years (58-62) (PANYNJ, 2003).  
At present, 20 airlines operate at the airport of which three have the greatest market 
share in terms of the number of flights and number of passengers, respectively: US 
Airways (38%; 14.2%), Delta (18%; 17.2%), and American (17%; 18.5 Two right 
angle-crossing runways, each of length of 7000ft (2135 m), mostly determine the airline 
fleet structure in terms of the aircraft size and length of routes-markets they serve. The 
fleet mostly consists of the aircraft categories B737/717, A320 (100-150 seat) as well as 
of some smaller regional jets and turboprops (70-110 seats). The average route length is 
1200 km (%) (Backer, 2000; Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 2003). 
The current runway capacity is about 80 (40/40) flights per hour under VMC (Visual 
Meteorological Conditions) and 64 (32/32) under IMC (Instrumental Meteorological 
Conditions) rules. The flights are accommodated at 60 apron parking stands.  
The hourly and daily demand in terms of the number of flights frequently exceeds the 
capacity of both components, which causes severe congestion and delays. Since there is 
not available land for the further physical expansion, the options for relieving the 
expected flight congestion and delays under conditions of growth (19% until the year 
2010 compared to the year 2002) appear to be very limited. The possible options 
actually consist of increasing of the average aircraft size on the one hand and rising of 
the runway capacity by introducing innovative operational procedures and technologies 
on the other. The former has already taken place by introducing B767-400ER (about 
280 seats) in the year 2001 (AIRWISE NEWS, 2001). The latter, which still have to 
take place, is expected to increase the runway capacity for about 10% under VMC and 
3% under IMC rules (Federal Aviation Administration, 2003a). Nevertheless, both 
options are not seemed to be able to efficiently cope with congestion beyond the year 
2010. This may again initiate thinking about implementing the economic measures of 
demand management. For example, the auction of slots (i.e., ‘slottery’) implemented in 
the year 2000 has substantially relieved congestion at that time. For the future,  
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congestion charging might  be reconsidered. At present, the airport landing charging is 
based on the aircraft weight. The unit charge is $6.55 for each five hundreds kilograms 
(thousand pounds) of the aircraft maximum take-off weight. In addition, each operation 
(flight) between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. is charged by the fixed amount of US$100 
(Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 2003a).        
 
5.1 Description of inputs 
 
Three groups of inputs are used in application of the proposed modelling procedure: 
data on the demand and capacity, for estimation of congestion and delays under given 
circumstances, and the aircraft operating costs and airfares, for assessing profitability of 
the particular flights.  
 
5.1.1 Data for estimating congestion and delays   
The hourly rates of the number of flights demanding service and their corresponding 
capacity at NY La Guardia airport for every day in July 2001 have been used for 
estimating congestion and delays. The distributions of the hourly flight demand and 
their service rate (i.e., the airport capacity) have been designed, each based on 31 daily 
realisations (Federal Aviation Administration, 2003; 2003a). Each distribution for each 
hour has been assumed to be normal or nearly normal and independent on the others. As 
well, the pairs of these distributions for different hours have also been assumed 
independent (Newell, 1982).  Table 2 gives the main parameters of these hourly 
distributions.  
In addition, in all experiments, the constant C  has been equal to 1.96, which has 
implied that the queues have stayed within the given confidence boundaries with 
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Table 2 The main parameters of distributions of the flight inter-arrival and inter 
-departure time in given example  
Time of the day 
   
Demand 
Flight inter-arrival time 
 
Capacity  
Flight service time 
Hour (k)  
 
Mean (ta, k) 
(s/flight) 
St. dev.(σ a, k) 
(s/flight)  
Mean (td, k) 
(s/flight) 
St. dev.(σ d, k)  
(s/flight) 
1 -  - - - 
2 -  - - - 
3 -  - - - 
4 -  - - - 
5 -  - - - 
6 90.72  9.972  52.56  7.488 
7 52.20  3.942  52.92  7.524 
8 50.76  3.123  52.2  4.608 
9 49.68  4.716  52.56  7.776 
10 50.04  4.860  52.20  7.164 
11 50.40  1.764  51.12  6.912 
12 50.76  2.376  51.12  6.984 
13 48.96  3.096  50.76  6.912 
14 51.84  3.744  50.76  6.336 
15 50.04  3.312  50.40  7.056 
16 48.24  2.916  50.40  7.020 
17 48.60  5.148  50.04  7.022 
18 51.48  8.640  50.04  7.020 
19 50.76  5.292  50.40  7.704 
20 51.84  7.992  49.68  6.624 
21 59.67  5.220  49.32  6.012 
22 78.12  16.236  49.32  5.976 
23 123.84  36.468  50.40  7.308 
24 -  - -  - 
s –seconds; Source: Federal Aviation Administration, 2003    
 
 
5.1.2 Aircraft operating costs   
The aircraft operating cost have been expressed per block hour, in dependence on the 
seat capacity. The data related to the U.S airlines are given in Figure 4 (Federal 
Aviation Administration, 1998). As can be seen, this cost increases with increasing of 
the aircraft seat capacity (size). According to given regression equation, the average cost 
of a flight of 100-150 seats (B737/717) operated at NY La Guardia airport varies 
between $US 2209 and  $US 3307 per hour (or $US 37 and $US 55 per minute). The 
cost of flight of 280 seats (for example B767-400ER), is $US 6162 per hour (or $US 
103 per minute). 
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5.1.3 The airfares  
The average airfare per passenger at NY La Guardia airport has been determined by 
using the U.S. data from the year 1998, but modified for changes in the value of $US 
for the year 2002  (Mendoza, 2002; Sheng-Chen, 2000).  Figure 5 illustrates 





























0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
































Figure 4 Dependence of the flight operating cost on aircraft seat capacity (Compiled 
from Federal Aviation Administration, 1998)   
Figure 5 Dependence of the average airfare on length of the non-stop flight (Compiled 
from Sheng-Chen, 2000; Mendoza, 2002)  
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r            Average airfare and route length at NY La Guardia airport   
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As can bee seen, the average airfare per passenger has increased at decreasing rate with 
increasing of route length, which can be explained by the fact that the airfares have 
reflected changing of the average unit cost per flight with the flying distance (Janic, 
2001). For NY LaGuardia airport the average length of flight has been about 1200 km, 
which has given the average airfare of about $US 152 (Mendoza, 2002).    
 
5.2 Analysis of the results 
 
The results from the experiments with the model are shown in Figures 6, 7, and 8. 
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a) Queue of flights  
















As can be seen in Figure 6a, during an average day, the queue of flights has started to 
form early in the morning just after opening the airport (06:00 hours), gradually 
increased afterwards, and reached the maximum between 19:00 and 20:00 hours. Then, 
during the next three hours (from 20:00 to 23:00 hours), the queue has been cleared. 
When the airport has operated at the declared capacity, the average queue has been 35 
and the maximum queue 59 flights. When the airport declared capacity has been 
diminished during the second half of the day (from 13:00 hours on, for example, for 
10%, the queue has additionally increased, reached the maximum of 93 flights between 
20:00 and 21:00 hours, and persisted until the midnight.   
Figure 6b illustrates the flight delays as the consequence of queue. As can be seen, the 
delay of the last flight in the queue has changed in line with changing of the queue 
length. When the airport has operated at the declared capacity, the average and 
maximum delay per flight has been 35-40 and 65 minutes per flight, respectively. In the 
case of deterioration of the airport capacity for about 10%, from 13:00 hours on, the 
average and maximum delay per flight has increased to about 55-65 and 105 minutes,  
respectively.   
Figure 6c illustrates changes of the marginal delay caused by changing of the 
scheduling time of an additional flight.. As can be seen, the flight scheduled early in the 
morning has imposed longer marginal delay then otherwise. In the given example, one 
Figure 6 The system congestion and delays in given example 
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such flight scheduled at 06:00 hours has imposed about 22 additional flight-hours of 
delay on the succeeding flights scheduled by the end of the congestion period. 
Scheduling of the new flight latter during the day has affected the smaller number of 
succeeding flights and caused less additional delays, as it has been intuitively expected. 
The average marginal delay imposed by an additional flight at any time during the day 
has been about 10-12 flight-hours. Deterioration of the airport declared capacity for 
10% has increased these delays, as well as the flight private delay. As can be seen in 
Figure 6b and 6c, marginal delay imposed on others has been much greater than the 
flight private delay.          
Figure 7 (a and b) shows the costs of an additional flight in the given example. Figure 
7a shows the cost of delay of an additional flight in dependence on the time of day and 
aircraft size. As can be seen, this cost has generally increased with increasing of the 
aircraft size due to its higher operating costs. For given aircraft size, this cost has been 
proportionally increased with delays.  For example, for an additional flight of capacity 
of 100, 150 and 280 seats scheduled between 19:00 and 20:00 hours, the cost of delay 
has been $US6500, $US3500 and $US2300, respectively.  
Figure 7b shows that the costs of marginal delay imposed by an additional flight on the 
succeeding flights have changed in proportion to the marginal delays. They have been 
the highest if the additional flight has been scheduled early in the morning and 
gradually decreased if this flight has been scheduled latter during the day. As well, these 
costs have been dependent on the aircraft (flight) types behind the additional flight, and 
vice versa. As has been expected, these costs have been higher if greater aircraft have 
been behind the additional flight. For example, the additional flight scheduled around 
06:00 has generated the marginal cost of about $US50, $US75 and $US150 thousands, 
when all flights behind him have been carried out by the aircraft capacity of 100, 150 
and 280 seats, respectively. Comparison of these marginal delay costs and current 
landing fees based on the aircraft weight have indicated existence of large 
disproportion. By summing up the costs of delays in Figure 7a and 7b, the costs of the 
total system delays caused by an additional flight have been obtained. Under such 
conditions, profitability of the additional flight has been estimated. Figure 8 shows 
conditions of such profitability in the given example. The additional flight of duration 
of 2 hours has been carried out by an aircraft of 150 seats with the operational cost of   
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All subsequent aircraft of 280 seats 
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Current landing fee:  
100 seat a/c (B717 types) (49 tones) - $US 742  
150 seat a/c (B737-400 types) (65.5 tonnes) - $US 958 
280 seat a/c (B767-400ER) (204 tones) - $US 2772 
Figure 7 The system cost imposed by an additional flight in given example  
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$US3300, the average load factor of 60%, the average airfare of $US152 and 
consequently the revenue of $US136800. As has been operated by an airline as the new 
entrant (i.e., without market share), and fully charged by the congestion charge, this 
flight has been highly unprofitable during the whole day, except sometimes after 22:30 
hours. Obviously, such entry would not be feasible under the conditions when all 
succeeding flights have been of 100 seats. However, when the given airline has already 
had significant market share in terms of the number of flights at the airport (85-90%), 


















and despite been fully charged. In Figure 8, under given circumstances, the airline 
should have at least about 85% of market share (and thus the equivalent percent of its 
non congestion-charged flights) in order to have an additional flight profitable. As can 
be seen, this flight would be at the edge of profitability if being scheduled until early 
afternoon and absolutely profitable if being scheduled later. Under given circumstances, 
by increasing of the airline market share above 85%, the additional flight would be 
profitable independently on the time during the day. This result confirms doubts that the 
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congestion charging might disfavour development of competition at the airport since it 
may impose unacceptably high congestion charges on flights of the new entrants on the 
one hand, and the very modest charges on flights of the airlines already being strongly 
present at the airport on the other. However, the congestion charging might stimulate 
flights to be carried out by the larger aircraft if being scheduled before the flights 
carried out by the smaller aircraft, and vice versa. As well, under given conditions, the 
charge might discourage the new flights during the first half of day, and particularly 
early in the morning.      
 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS  
 
The paper has dealt with modelling of the congestion charging at airports. At present, 
congestion charging has not been practised at the airports worldwide despite many of 
them have already charged differently the services during the peak and off-peak periods. 
The modelling has consisted of three components: the queuing model based on the 
diffusion approximation used for estimation of the relevant queues and delays of flights; 
the model to estimate the marginal delays and their cost imposed on the succeeding 
flights by an additional flight during congestion; and the model for estimation of the 
profitability of an additional flight after being imposed the congestion charge on. The 
modelling procedure has been demonstrated on the example of New York (NY) 
LaGuardia airport.  
The results have shown that the queues and delays of flights have persisted for the 
whole day.  Decreasing of the airport declared capacity has increased these queues and 
delays, from the time of disruption on. The additional time has been needed to clear 
increased queues. The system cost of delays has raised in proportion to the delays and 
the aircraft size (i.e., seat capacity).  
The additional flight scheduled at the beginning of the congestion period has imposed 
the greatest marginal delays, and vice versa. The marginal costs have increased in 
proportion to the increasing of these delays on the one hand and the size of the 
succeeding aircraft on the other, and vice versa.   
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The congestion charge has been lower for an additional flight scheduled by an airline 
having a greater market share since this flight has affected the smaller number of flights 
scheduled by other airlines, and vice versa. This has confirmed the fact that the 
congestion charging might disfavour competition at the airport.  
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